Audit Opinion and Earnings Quality: Evidence from Korea by Yoon, Seon-Ju et al.
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.12, No.30, 2020 
 
7 
Audit Opinion and Earnings Quality: Evidence from Korea 
 
Seon-Ju Yoon 
College of Business Administration, Inha University, 100 Inha-ro, Michuhol-gu, Incheon 22212, KOREA 
 
Jaimin Goh 
College of Business Administration, Inha University, 100 Inha-ro, Michuhol-gu, Incheon 22212, KOREA 
 
Jin-Young Jung* 




This study examines whether the decrease in qualified opinions is due to improved accruals quality. The proportion 
of qualified opinions has been declining in Korea for about 10 years. However, it has not been reported that 
earnings quality has improved. We analyze this contradictory relationship using two models. We find that Korean 
firms’ accruals quality has no association with unqualified opinions. This means that the increasing trend in 
unqualified opinions is occurring regardless of earnings quality, although audit opinion chiefly depends on it. Thus, 
our results suggest that more researches are required to determine why qualified opinions are declining. 
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1. Introduction 
Auditors generate audit opinions, which reduce the asymmetry between firms and investors [1-3]. The audit 
opinion is affected not only by firms’ financial condition but also by the audit environment [4-6]. This means that 
auditors are affected by their independence in terms of information quality. 
This study examines whether improvements in accruals quality increases the proportion of unqualified 
opinions. We are interested in this relationship because the proportion of unqualified opinions increased 
consistently around 2010 in the Korean capital market. We therefore investigate whether this increase came from 
good accruals quality given the research finding that auditors are prone to give a qualified opinion to bad accruals 
quality [7,8]. 
We cannot find a significant relationship between firms’ accruals quality and unqualified auditor opinion. 
Thus, auditors’ audit opinion may not offer useful information to investors. Moreover, our finding implies that 
investors may be skeptical of auditors’ independence from managers. 
This study asks why the percentage of unqualified opinions is high regardless of accruals quality. However, 
it does not investigate detailed accounting titles regarding audit opinions. Such an analysis could help researchers 
reveal the hidden cause of the high proportion of unqualified opinions. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and establishes the study’s 
hypothesis. Section 3 explains the study’s variables, samples, and empirical models. Section 4 presents the 
descriptive statistics and results of the study. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
The audit opinion explains whether investors should trust the firms’ financial statements. A qualified opinion 
warns investors to be careful in considering the accounting numbers in the financial statement. Therefore, the audit 
opinion is important in that it can provide useful information to market participants. 
Francis and Krishnan [7] analyze accounting conservatism among auditors using data on US firms. They 
suggest that the audit opinion provides information on the possibility of cash realization. Bartov et al. [8] report a 
significant relationship between discretionary accruals and qualified opinions using the Jones model [9] and a 
modified Jones model [10]. 
However, audit opinions can be affected by the independence of the auditors. Chow and Rice 4] show that 
auditors tend to be replaced after giving qualified opinions, and Lennox [5] finds that managers are more likely to 
hire a new auditor when auditors give unfavorable audit opinions on the firm. 
These results suggest that managers often engage in “audit opinion shopping” by hiring a new auditor. This 
also applies to Korean firms. Using the findings of Lennox [5], Choi and Jung [6] examine if audit opinion 
shopping is common in the Korean market. They show that an increased possibility of a qualified opinion increases 
managers’ tendency to replace their auditors; it is also unlikely that current auditors will be hired again if there is 
little chance of an unqualified opinion for the next year. Moreover, auditor change via audit opinion shopping is 
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associated with greater discretionary accruals in earnings management. Thus, audit opinions are affected by 
pressure regarding rehiring, which can impair auditor independence. 
Bradshaw et al. [11] investigate whether auditors and financial analysts warn investors about the financial 
consequences of high accounting accrual levels. They find no evidence that financial analysts and auditors act as 
information intermediaries when accounting accruals are at high levels. Using US data from 1994 to 1999, Butler 
et al. [12] show that there is no relationship between discretionary accruals and audit opinion. Contrariwise, 
Herbohn and Ragunathan [13] argue that there is a negative relation between discretionary accruals and qualified 
opinion.  
Table 1 presents each year’s accruals quality based on qualified and unqualified opinions using the Jones [9] 
and modified Jones models [10]. As shown in panels A and B, the figures for accruals quality are similar in the 
two audit opinion groups. 
Figure 1 shows the proportion of qualified opinion for each year. Each year’s figure is calculated as the 
number of qualified opinions divided by that of all audit opinions. 33The proportion of qualified opinions decreases 
overall. Table 1 and Figure 1 indicate that auditors give unqualified opinions regardless of the firm’s accrual 
quality. Based on the literature and our two preliminary analyses, we propose the following null hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Audit opinion is not related to the quality of accounting accruals. 







































































Pooled -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 
AQ1 = accruals quality via Jones model [9]; AQ2 = accruals quality via modified Jones model [10] 
 
Figure 1. Trend in proportion of qualified opinions 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Estimation of Accruals Quality 
This study uses the Jones [9] and modified Jones [10] models to proxy for earnings quality. These two models are 
widely used to calculate discretionary accruals; earnings quality is dependent on accounting accruals. 
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are based on Jones [9] and Dechow et al. [10]. We then multiply the measures by (-1) because accruals quality 








𝛼 ϵ       (2) 
 
𝐴𝑄 |𝜀| 1           (3) 
where 
TAC = total accruals (net income - cash flow from operation); 
A = total assets; 
SALES = total revenue; 
REV = accounting receivables; 
PPE = property, plant, and equipment. 
 
3.2 Empirical Model 
This study examines the effect of accruals quality on auditors’ audit opinions. We employ logistic linear regression 
using the dependent variable OPN, set to 1 if the audit opinion is unqualified opinion and 0 otherwise. The main 
explanatory variable is accruals quality, AQ, which is defined as AQ1 (Jones model) and AQ2 (modified Jones 
model). If auditors are more likely to give an unqualified opinion for high-quality earnings, the regression 
coefficient of AQ should be positive. However, if earnings quality does not affect the audit opinion, the coefficient 
should not be significant. Thus, 
𝑂𝑃𝑁 𝛼 𝛼 𝐴𝑄 𝛼 𝐵𝐼𝐺4 𝛼 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 𝛼 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝛼 𝐿𝐸𝑉 𝛼 𝐵𝑇𝑀        𝛼 𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝛼 𝐹𝑂𝑅
∑𝑌𝑅 ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷 ε          (4) 
where    
OPN = 1 if audit opinion is unqualified and 0 otherwise; 
AQ = accruals quality; 
AQ1 = accruals quality estimated by Jones model [9]; 
AQ2 = accruals quality estimated by modified Jones model [10]; 
Big4 = 1 if auditor is a Big 4 and 0 otherwise; 
IFRS = 1 if year is after IFRS adoption (2011–2014) and 0 otherwise; 
SIZE = ln(total assets); 
LEV = total liability/total assets; 
BTM = book value of equity/market value of equity; 
ROA = net income/total assets; 
FOR = foreign investor ownership. 
The study’s control variables are as follows. BIG4 is a dummy variable set to 1 if the auditor is a Big Four 
accounting firm. Generally, these firms are known to provide a high quality of audit service and to run a more 
strict review. However, they may compromise audit opinion because Big Four accounting firms cost more when 
they lose the auditee firm. IFRS is used to control for the 2011 change in accounting standards from the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principle (K-GAAP) to the International Financial Reporting Standards (K-IFRS). K-IFRS 
enables managers to have more accounting discretion, and it has made the auditors’ role more important. The 
variable is set to 1 for years since 2011, when K-IFRS became mandatory. 
Firm size can affect the independence of an auditor [14]. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LEV is the 
value of total liabilities divided by total assets. Highly levered firms are prone to receiving unfavorable audit 
opinions because a higher debt ratio implies lower financial soundness. BTM is the book value to the market price 
of stocks. Generally, firm assets are undervalued when BTM is low, which leads to a high probability of mergers 
and acquisitions and lawsuits [15]. When the potential for lawsuits is high, auditors are prone to give unfavorable 
opinions. ROA is return on assets, reflecting firms’ profitability. High firm performance is a positive signal for 
audit opinions. FOR is the percentage of foreign investor ownership. Foreign investors demand quality not only 
in earnings but also in audits; thus, they tend to make audit opinions more conservative [16]. 
 
3.3 Sample Selection 
For the empirical analysis, we collect data on firms listed in the Korean stock market from 2003 to 2014. We 
download financial and audit opinion data from the FnGuide database, excluding observations with insufficient 
information. To ensure homogeneity among the observations, we exclude observations in which the fiscal year-
end is not December, observations for financial institutions, and observations with impaired capital. To ensure 
reliability in the estimation of discretionary accruals, observations with fewer than 20 industry-years are filtered 
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out. Finally, we winsorize the observations at the top and bottom 1% to control for the effect of outliers. The final 
sample used in the analysis consists of 3,854 firm-year observations. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Univariate Analyses 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. The mean value of OPN, reflecting unqualified opinion, 
is 0.989. This indicates that about 99% of the observations receive an unqualified opinion, consistent with the data 
in Figure 1. The means of explanatory variables AQ1 and AQ2, reflecting accruals quality as calculated by the 
Jones and modified Jones models, are –0.060 and –0.060, respectively. 
Table 3 presents the correlation of each variable. The variables for quality of earnings (AQ1 and AQ2) are 
significantly correlated with the variable for audit opinion (OPN), at 0.049 and 0.057, respectively. These 
correlation coefficients indicate that higher accruals quality increases the chance of an unqualified opinion. An 
unqualified audit opinion is positively correlated with all the control variables except for LEV and BTM. We find 
that auditors are more likely to give unqualified opinions when the auditor is a Big Four accounting firm and after 
K-IFRS is adopted. Moreover, firms with more foreign investor ownership tend to receive an unqualified opinion. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
Variables Obs. Mean STD Minimum Median Maximum 
OPN 3,854 0.989 0.106 0.000 1.000 1.000 
AQ1 3,854 -0.060 0.064 -0.355 -0.042 -0.001 
AQ2 3,854 -0.060 0.061 -0.337 -0.042 -0.001 
BIG4 3,854 0.673 0.469 0.000 1.000 1.000 
IFRS 3,854 0.388 0.487 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 3,854 19.776 1.560 16.908 19.536 24.245 
LEV 3,854 0.469 0.196 0.083 0.472 0.932 
BTM 3,854 1.606 1.183 0.148 1.299 6.607 
ROA 3,854 0.020 0.089 -0.450 0.031 0.190 
FOR 3,854 10.425 14.272 0.000 3.959 66.522 
Variable definitions: 
OPN = 1 if audit opinion is unqualified and 0 otherwise; 
AQ = accruals quality; 
AQ1 = accruals quality estimated by Jones [9] model; 
AQ2 = accruals quality estimated by modified Jones model [10]; 
Big4 = 1 if auditor is Big 4 and 0 otherwise; 
IFRS = 1 if year is after IFRS adoption (2011–2014) and 0 otherwise; 
SIZE = ln(total assets); 
LEV = total liabilities/total assets; 
BTM = book value of equity/market value of equity; 
ROA = net income/total assets; 
FOR = foreign investor ownership. 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix. 












































































































































































Refer to Table 1 for variable definitions; values in parentheses are p-values. 
 
4.2 Regression Results 
Table 4 shows the results of the regression analysis. As this study examines whether the decrease in qualified audit 
opinions is due to improved earnings quality, we investigate whether accruals quality affects the audit opinion. 
The result of the logistic linear regression shows that audit opinion is not significantly related to accruals quality 
as derived by the Jones (AQ1) and modified Jones models (AQ2). We therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis 
and conclude that the proportion of qualified audit opinions is declining regardless of accruals quality. 
Among the control variables, the dependent variable is positively associated with BIG4, IFRS, and BTM. 
Therefore, firms are prone to receiving unqualified opinions when the auditor works for a Big Four accounting 
firm, when the firm’s assets are undervalued, and after Korean firms adopted K-IFRS. 
Table 4. Effect of accruals quality on audit opinion. 
Variables 
AQ1 AQ2 
Estimate Wald value Estimate Wald value 
Intercept 7.89 6.15** 8.32 6.82*** 
AQ 1.28 0.41 2.80 1.86 
BIG4 2.84 27.69*** 2.85 27.57*** 
IFRS 2.24 4.29** 2.22 4.20** 
SIZE -0.17 1.10 -0.19 1.32 
LEV -0.78 0.71 -0.74 0.64 
BTM 0.47 5.76** 0.45 5.26** 
ROA 0.14 0.01 -0.10 0.00 
FOR 0.02 0.50 0.02 0.53 
Year Dummies Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included 
# of Obs. 3,854 3,854 
Likelihood ratio 125.16*** 126.53*** 
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study is motivated by the fact that most Korean listed firms receive unqualified audit opinions and that this 
tendency is increasing. The study seeks to determine whether these unqualified opinions are due to accruals quality. 
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The literature argues that audit opinions provide reliable information as long as auditors tend to give unfavorable 
opinions on low-quality earnings [7,8]. However, recent studies show that managers tend to opinion-shop, which 
can damage auditors’ independence and lower the reliability of their information and its usefulness to investors 
[5,11–13]. The high proportion of unqualified audit opinions should ideally be related to the quality of earnings; 
the lack of such a relationship would compromise the value of information related to audit opinion. 
We use data on KOSPI listed firms covering 2003 to 2014 to analyze the relationship between audit opinion 
and accruals quality. The empirical result shows that the high proportion of unqualified opinions is not related to 
the quality of accruals, implying that auditors’ opinions have doubtful informational value. 
This study has several limitations. It measures the quality of earnings only using the estimation model. Future 
research should extend our study by analyzing specific accounting titles. Moreover, future studies should 
determine if the empirical results vary according to the type of auditors considered. Also, future studies need to 
discover the hidden driver of the increasing proportion of unqualified audit opinions. 
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